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Note 
Indigenous Reparations Re-Imagined: 
Crafting a Settlement Mechanism for 
Indigenous Claims in the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights 
Sean Burke∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights (IACHR/ “the Commission”) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR/ “the Court”),1 these 
two organs of the Organization of American States (OAS) have 
addressed human rights promotion and protection in the 
member States of the OAS.2 Together, the IACHR and the 
IACtHR comprise the Inter-American System (IAS).3 For over 
twenty years they have been developing legal theories focused 
on the plight of indigenous populations within the region of the 
American States.4 While the IACtHR has found in claimants’ 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., Creighton 
University, 2004. The author would like to thank the staff and editors of the 
journal, especially all those who helped improve this note. 
 1. The OAS created the IACHR in 1959 to observe and report on the general 
human rights situation in member states of the OAS, in fulfillment of the 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the first human rights instrument 
introduced in the Americas in 1948. In 1965, the IACHR was authorized to 
examine petitions alleging human rights abuses in member states.  Then, after it 
adopted the American Convention of Human Rights in 1969, the OAS created the 
IACtHR as a judicial forum in which to adjudicate cases of human rights abuses 
brought against states which are parties to the Convention. See What is the 
IACHR? INTER-AM. COMMISSION HUM. RTS., ORG. AM. STS., 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (2nd 
ed. 2004). 
 4. See id. at 32–33 (discussing the inclusion, first in 1972 and more 
consistently since 1993, of indigenous issues in country reports issues by the 
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favor in indigenous claims of property rights, protection under 
the law, and right to life,5 the history of reparations reveals an 
inconsistency in the provision of adequate compensation for 
these claims.6   
Currently, the IAS faces difficulties ensuring justice for 
indigenous claimants. Often, the IAS responds to claims in an 
untimely fashion and the abuses in the original claim generally 
continue to occur even after favorable judgments.7  The IAS 
needs new strategies in order to address these two threats to 
indigenous claimants’ access to justice. 
At the same time, the IAS recognizes that the influx of new 
claims has hampered the adjudicative bodies’ effectiveness to 
address the claims.8 One proposal to deal with this problem is 
the increased use of friendly settlement mechanisms.9 A variety 
of factors suggest that such mechanisms will become important 
tools for improving the effectiveness of all regional human 
rights bodies, including the IAS. While the IAS has yet to 
 
IACHR); see also id. at 259–71 (providing an overview of the IACHR and IACtHR 
jurisprudence on indigenous rights). These theories have centered on the use of 
reparations as the mechanism for redress of the various abuses perpetrated against 
these populations.  Id. See generally Q&A: Indigenous Rights Appeals Increasingly 
Reach Inter-American System, IPS NEWS (Oct. 8, 2009), 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48775 [hereinafter, Q&A] (describing how 
indigenous communities are increasingly accessing the Inter-American Human 
Rights System). 
 5. See S. JAMES ANAYA, supra note 3, at 267–68 (discussing cases that have 
reached the IACtHR, specifically that of the Awas Tingni in Nicaragua, and the 
Court’s judgments therein).  
 6. See id. at 269 (noting that reparations in the Awas Tingni case were 
problematic for a number of reasons, including the calculation of the sum and the 
implementation of the Court’s orders).   
 7. Cf. Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 101, 104 (2008) (noting the 
“rate of compliance with the remedial orders in the Inter-American system is lower 
than in the European system”). 
 8. See Address by the President of IACHR, Paulo G. Carozza, INTER-AM. 
COMMISSION HUM. RTS., ORG. AM. STS. (JUNE 3, 2008), 
http://www.cidh.org/Discursos/06.03.08eng.htm [hereinafter Carozza] (addressing 
the need to find creative methods in managing an increasing backlog of cases before 
the Commission). 
 9. Id. (discussing a proposed project intended to increase the use of friendly 
settlements in the Commission). Friendly settlements area a common feature of 
international human rights systems and represent the primary manner in which 
parties may agree to a resolution of the dispute. The European and IAS systems 
require Court approval of the settlement to confirm that it conforms to applicable 
human rights laws. See JO M. PASQUAALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF 
THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 149 (Cambridge University Press 
2003) 
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decide on a comprehensive settlement mechanism, improving 
the use of indigenous reparations claims by borrowing aspects 
of other settlement techniques provides one avenue for better 
efficiency and justice.  
Part I of this Note describes the hurdles facing indigenous 
claimants in the IAS, while Part II introduces tools of 
international dispute resolution.  Part III of this Note lays out 
the broad foundations for using such tools to transform 
indigenous reparations into a type of friendly settlement 
mechanism and explains how such a mechanism provides a 
better method of resolving indigenous property rights claims in 
the IAS than the current system.  
I. CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING INDIGENOUS 
REPARATIONS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN 
RIGHTS SYSTEM 
The path for an indigenous claimant seeking redress in the 
IAS is challenging. The claims of the Yakye Axa, an indigenous 
people in Paraguay, exemplify the difficulties claimants often 
encounter.10 Like many indigenous groups throughout Latin 
America, the Yakye Axa have suffered systematic 
discrimination, oppression, and isolation at the hands of 
various regimes.11 Even after the decline of twentieth century 
despotic governments and the establishment of international 
norms recognizing various rights of indigenous populations,12 
 
 10. Along with the Yakye Axa, another indigenous group, the Sawhoyamaxa, 
also won a favorable judgment from the IACtHR that was not implemented by the 
Paraguyan government. See ‘We’re Only Asking for What is Ours’ Indigenous 
Peoples in Paraguay - Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa, AMNESTY INT’L 3 (Mar., 2009), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR45/005/2009/en (follow “Download: 
PDF” hyperlink) [hereinafter AMNESTY] (noting the failure of the Paraguayan 
government to respect the IACtHR’s judgments). In August of 2010, the IACtHR 
ruled against Paraguay for a third time in the context of indigenous rights when it 
found the government had violated the right to life, communal property, and 
judicial protection of another indigenous group, the Xakmok Kasek people. See 
Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2010 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 214 (Aug. 24, 2010). 
 11. Id. at 2 (profiling the plight of Paraguay’s Indigenous population, including 
the Yayke Axa). 
 12. See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, supra note 3, at 49–184 (documenting the 
development and content of contemporary human rights norms protecting 
indigenous peoples). For a historical assessment about the lack of State recognition 
of international attempts to recognize indigenous populations, see Anaya’s analysis 
of international norm development. Id. at 34 (arguing that early international law 
efforts to recognize indigenous rights “succumbed to a state-centered Eurocentric 
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domestic judicial and political structures have not consistently 
protected the rights of indigenous groups such as the Yakye 
Axa. The destruction of indigenous lands, and the inability and 
unwillingness of governments to reclaim them from third-party 
landowners,13 represent significant barriers contributing to 
delayed domestic justice. Unsuccessful domestic legal battles 
led the Yakye Axa to seek international adjudicative solutions 
from the IAS.14  
In 2005, after nearly twelve years of adjudication in 
Paraguayan domestic courts and the IAS, the Yakye Axa won a 
favorable judgment from the IACtHR.15 The IACtHR found 
violations of the Yakye Axa’s rights to judicial protection, 
property, and life.16 Despite the IACtHR’s ruling, however, the 
deadline for the Paraguayan government’s compliance with the 
judgment has passed.17 The struggle of the Yakye Axa 
represents the basic challenges of claimants seeking justice 
including: navigating the long and unpredictable domestic and 
international judicial processes, fighting for appropriate 
reparations standards, and ultimately having a successful 
claim rendered worthless through ineffective enforcement of 
the judgment. 
A. WAITING FOR JUDGMENT 
The primary obstacles facing claimants such as the Yakye 
Axa are the time and resources necessary to bring a claim to 
the IAS. A fundamental principle of regional human rights 
adjudication is that claimants must first exhaust all domestic 
remedies before going to the IACHR.18 Even after meeting this 
and other preliminary qualifications,19 resolution requires a 
 
system that could not accommodate indigenous peoples and their cultures as 
equals”). 
 13. See AMNESTY, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing Congressional opposition to 
measures to restore the land to the Yakye Axa). 
 14. Id. at 2. 
 15. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 2005 Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005). 
 16. Id. at §§ VIII–X. See also Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, RT. TO EDUC. PROJECT, 
http://www.right-to-education.org/node/679 (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) 
(summarizing the basic rulings of the court). 
 17. AMNESTY, supra note 10. 
 18. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123, art. 46(1)(a) (1992) [hereinafter Convention]. See generally What is 
the IACHR?, supra note 1. 
 19. Convention, supra note 17, art. 46(1)(b) (the filing must come “six months 
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long waiting period due to the existing backlog of cases facing 
the IAS.20   
An increase in the volume of claims in recent years has 
slowed the pace of the IAS.  Between 2004 and 2008, over 1,300 
complaints were filed with the Commission each year;21 in 2009, 
only 122 petitions were processed.22 This backlog has forced 
concerned administrative officials to begin to look toward 
alternative measures of dispute resolution to solve the basic 
problems caused by the influx in pending cases.23  The current 
backlog will likely deny claimants timely and efficient justice. 
The current caseload of the IACHR suggests that new 
developments in settlement mechanisms will be necessary to 
improve the overall effectiveness of the systems.24 Currently, 
the IACHR allows for a procedure called friendly settlement.25 
The procedure, which the IACHR was originally reluctant to 
utilize, allows States to avoid the publication of an unfavorable 
report by agreeing to reach a friendly settlement with the 
complaining party.26 The authority of the IACHR to induce 
States to settle human rights claims is generally understood as 
persuasive rather than binding authority.27 Since the language 
 
from the date on which the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of the 
final judgment”); id. art. 46(1)(c) (the subject matter must not be in the process of 
adjudication in another international proceedings); id. art. 46(1)(d) (the filing must 
contain basic logistical information). 
 20. See generally What is the IACHR?, supra note 1. 
 21. Inter-Am. Comm’n of Human Rights, Annual Report 2009, ch. 3(B)(1)(d), 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II 134, Doc. 5, rev. 1 (Feb. 25, 2009). Complaints include all written 
complaints regarding a supposed violation of a relevant human rights instrument. 
Over 2,000 petitions in 2009 were evaluated. Id. at ch. 3(B)(1)(d). 
 22. Id. at ch. 3(B)(1)(c). In all 1,450 cases are pending before the Commission 
as of the end of 2009. Id. at ch. 3(B)(1)(g), 
 23. See Carozza, supra note 8. In his 2008 address on the state of the 
Commission, the President of the Inter-American Commission listed the measures 
the Commission was taking to help ease the financial and administrative burden of 
protecting human rights in the region.  Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
INTER-AM. COMMISSION HUM. RTS., ORG. AM. STS., art. 40 (Oct. 28-Nov. 13, 2009), 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic18.RulesOfProcedureIACHR.htm 
[hereinafter Rules of Procedure]. 
 26. See Patricia E. Standaert, The Friendly Settlement of Human Rights 
Abuses in the Americas, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 521, 523 (1999). 
 27. See Generally ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
SITUATION OF THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN THE AMERICAS (2000), available at 
http://cidh.oas.org/Indigenas/TOC.htm (stating that the Commission will only 
facilitate settlement during the indigenous claims procedure “for a fixed period of 
time…[and only] if the parties are so disposed…”). 
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of Article 48(1)(f) of the American Convention of Human Rights 
simply states that the Commission “shall place itself at the 
disposal of the parties concerned with a view to reaching a 
friendly settlement,”28 the impetus falls on the States to 
demand and/or agree to settlement proceedings on their own 
accord and without any mandatory ruling from the IACHR.  
Although logistical questions of resources and willpower may 
affect the eventual scope of a settlement regime, a key obstacle 
to the implementation of these mechanisms is the ability of the 
IAS to mandate and push for settlements.29 Many scholars 
believe, however, that the IAS will begin to implement some 
type of stronger friendly settlement mechanism, though no one 
has indicated what friendly settlement system that may be.30  
B. DEVELOPING AND ENFORCING AN APPROPRIATE REPARATIONS 
STANDARD FOR PROPERTY CLAIMS 
As evidenced by the IACtHR’s ruling in favor of the Yakye 
Axa’s property rights, the current regional and international31 
standards for reparations represent a significant improvement 
over previous remedies available to indigenous communities.32  
This evolution has also occurred as Latin American 
governments have taken their own initiative to interpret 
 
 28. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, 
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American 
Convention]. 
 29. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, at art. 40.2 (clarifying that parties 
initiate and ultimately control the continuation of any friendly settlement process). 
 30. See generally Standaert, supra note 26, at 523–24 (highlighting problems 
with the friendly settlement system). 
 31. International human rights movements have made significant strides in 
utilizing and evolving the reparations concept away from simply a small monetary 
compensation. See Arturo J. Carrillo, The Relevance of Inter-American Human 
Rights Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 512–27 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 2006) 
(analyzing the types of reparations awarded by the IACtHR to human rights 
victims).  
 32. See Organization of American States, Principal Guidelines for a 
Comprehensive Reparations Policy, 1–2, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. 
OAE/Ser/L/V/II.131, doc. 1 (Feb. 19, 2008); See also Interview with Víctor 
Abramovich,, supra note 4 (quoting from the special Rappatour who sees 
improvements over previous reparations systems because “[t]he system is 
consolidating a collection of principles, and achieving the resolution of particular 
cases, through friendly settlements or precautionary measures.”). See generally 
Conference, Reparations in the Inter-American System: A Comparative Approach, 
56 Am. U. L. Rev. 1376 (2007) available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/la
wrev/56/reparations.pdf?rd=1 (tracing the development, evolution, and 
effectiveness of the IAS’s reparations jurisprudence). 
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human rights norms33 and orchestrate reparations programs.34  
While there is not a bright line standard set in the Inter-
American system,35 the IACHR has generally held that just 
compensation: 
[S]hould materialize in the form of individual measures 
calculated to constitute restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation for the victim, as well as general measures of 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition 
False[R]eparations should consist of measures that tend to 
make the effects of the violations committed disappear. Their 
nature and amount will depend on the damage caused both at 
the pecuniary and non-pecuniary levels. Reparations cannot 
involve enrichment or impoverishment of the victim or his or 
her heirs.36  
In order to evaluate appropriate remedies within this 
standard, an adjudicative body must determine the source of 
law by which to judge the merits of the case. Aside from 
violations of judicial protection, this choice of law generally 
falls between two broad categories; indigenous property and 
indigenous right to life claims.37 
The various characteristics of right to life claims may make 
them less suitable for the current settlement procedures offered 
by the IACHR.38 Some advocates recognize that settlement 
options in these types of claims are limited, and ultimately self-
defeating.39 Claimants and other advocates of indigenous rights 
may also wary of the bargaining and negotiation aspects of 
 
 33. See Neuman, supra note 7, at 114–15. 
 34. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Minorities at Risk Project, 
Assessment for Indigenous Peoples in Honduras, (31 December 2003) 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f3a8d2b.html (recognizing an improvement 
in living conditions for the Miskito people, a Honduran Indigenous minority group, 
since the late 1980s).  
 35. See Organization of American States, Principal Guidelines for a 
Comprehensive Reparations Policy, supra note 31, at 1. 
 36.  Id. at 2 (noting "The State must play a primary, rather than secondary, 
role in guaranteeing victims' effective access to reparations, in accordance with the 
standards of international law.") 
 37. See American Convention, supra note 28 (defining the right to life and 
right to property). The IACtHR ruling in favor of the Yakye Axa divided the 
violations into three categories: property, life, and judicial jrotection. See case cited 
supra note 15. 
 38. See Standaert, supra note 26, at 520 (noting that mediation in the context 
human rights adjudication may not fully encourage respect for human rights 
because of the crimes are horrific, the abusers are not held criminally accountable, 
and victims may not feel a sense of justice). 
 39. See id. at 530–32.   
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dispute resolution when the other stakeholders have 
perpetrated heinous crimes against the fundamental human 
rights of indigenous peoples.40  
Reparations advocates have experienced success in 
developing a systematic jurisprudence of indigenous property 
rights against various other actors.41 With the pattern of abuse 
stretching from the colonization of the western hemisphere, 
indigenous groups have found themselves with little recourse to 
reclaim lands held by large territorial landowners, businesses, 
and the government itself.42  States’ growing interest in 
minerals and valuable property has continued to render 
indigenous land an attractive target for exploitation. Working 
in concert with or with the tacit permission of State authority,43 
landowners are often successful in repressing indigenous 
protests and attempts to reclaim such lands or assert their 
rights.44 For example, in the case of the Yakye Axa, the third 
party landowners were able to convince legislative authorities 
to table the executive branch’s request to carry out the 
IACtHR’s judgment.45 Even more prevalent are claims that a 
State acted in its official capacity to destroy indigenous 
communities.46 Despite these obstacles, progress has been 
 
 40. See id. at 528 (noting that the power imbalance between individual and 
state parties represents a grave challenge in mediation’s ability to secure human 
rights). 
 41. Ruth Rubio-Marín, Gender and Collective Reparation in the Aftermath, in 
THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING SEXUAL HIERARCHIES WHILE 
REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 381, 385–87 (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 
Cambridge University Press 2009) (laying out a theory of collective reparations 
focused on group characteristics, such as indigenous culture); See generally 
Organization of American States [OAS], The Human Rights Situation of the 
Indigenous People in the Americas, Inter-Am. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.108, Doc. 62, Ch. 1 
(2000), available at http://www.cidh.org/indigenas/chap.1.htm (outlining the history 
of indigenous jurisprudence in the IACHR). 
 42. See S. JAMES ANAYA, supra note 3, at 142 (noting that early international 
property law recognized indigenous land rights via historical use but allowed for 
termination of such rights through unilateral government action or simple 
monetary transfers).  
 43. See generally AMNESTY, supra note 10, at 2–5 (explaining how 
governmental authorities have failed to restore land to the indigenous people). 
 44. See id. at 5. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Community of Rio Negro of the Maya 
Indigenous People and its Members, http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2008eng/Gu
atemala844.05eng.htm (detailing how the Guatemalan government ordered armed 
forces to violate the right to property and the right to life of the Maya indigenous 
community at the Río Negro so as to secure the land for the use of a Hydro-electric 
dam). 
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noticeable, at least in the recognition of international norms 
protecting indigenous rights to property, cultural integrity, 
nondiscrimination, and self-determination.47 Scholars, activists, 
and even some court decisions are beginning to recognize not 
only real property claims, but also intellectual property 
claims.48  
Even when indigenous claimants win a favorable judgment 
in the IACHR or the IACtHR, however, the IAS struggles to 
implement and enforce the judgment.49 Once a claimant brings 
the claim into the Inter-American human rights system, the 
State is generally less cooperative than if it had taken the 
initiative to set up a reparations program on its own.50 If the 
parties reach a friendly settlement agreement that the IACHR 
approves,51 the State may still stall or refuse to implement the 
agreed upon measures of reparation.52 These tactics range from 
 
 47. S. JAMES ANAYA, supra note 3, at 142. 
 48. The current movement to have indigenous customs recognized in 
intellectual property law represents the most recent trend in indigenous rights 
activism. This relatively new movement represents a significant increase in 
awareness of indigenous rights, but does not mean the more significant claims of 
real property have primarily been met. See Maui Solomon, Intellectual Property 
Rights and Indigenous Peoples Rights and Obligations, 
http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/ra01/ms2.html#Anchor-Introduction-15970  
(last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (arguing the indigenous framework of property rights 
incorporates a principle of reciprocity, so that obligations of the cultural tradition 
are balanced against the right to use and exploit cultural values including real 
property). 
 49. At a Conference discussing challenges to implementation , then Secretary 
of the IACHR, Santiago A. Canton, stated 
Apart from Colombia and Peru-which have adopted some legislation to effect 
compliance with certain aspects of international judgments and reports in 
individual cases-there are no other examples of institutional mechanisms designed 
to comply with reparations granted in the Inter-American system. Today, the 
Commission’s recommendations on individual cases are complied with only when 
there is a combination of political will and a search for creative ways to comply 
even if the measures adopted are not technically permitted under domestic law.  
Reparations in the Inter-American System: A Comparative Approach, supra note 32, 
at 1455. 
 50. See Generally International Center for Transitional Justice and Human 
Rights Association, Design Parameters for a Reparations Program in Peru  (Sept. 
2002) http://www.ictj.org/static/Americas/Peru/Parameters.eng.pdf (suggesting that 
the most successful reparations programs have been those developed by 
governments themselves and not those mandated by international arbitration 
bodies). 
 51. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, at art. 40.5 (explaining how the 
IACHR verifies that the claimants have agreed to the settlement and that the 
resolution is “based on respect for the human rights recognized in the American 
Convention on Human Rights”). 
 52. See Natalia Ruiz Díaz,: Int'l Backing for Indigenous Land Claims, INTER 
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designating the disputed land as protected preserves,53 citing 
domestic property laws as obstacles to reparation, and 
deferment of the issue to State legislatures where the influence 
of third party landowners and corporations often stall 
proceedings.54 Even if the government acquiesces to a 
judgment, it often claims a lack of power to effectuate or compel 
the cooperation of the landowner.55 In addition, those 
government officials who attempt to implement IAS judgments 
or recommendations may find themselves in danger of 
prosecution.56 In the case of the Yakye Axa, the State used the 
tactic of deferring the matter to its legislative process.57 
II. THE ECHR’S SPECIALIZED  
FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT TOOLS 
Many scholars and practitioners recognize the 
underdeveloped use of dispute resolution tactics in areas of 
international law, particularly outside the realm of 
international economic agreements.58 However, the concept of 
friendly settlement has not been completely abandoned in 
contentious proceedings, as evinced by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), where friendly settlement is used with 
 
PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENDY, Oct. 9, 2009 available at http://www.ipsnews.net/ne
ws.asp?idnews=48789  (outlining the delayed implementation of government-
promised reparations to indigenous communities). 
 53. Id. (noting that the Paraguayan government declared part of previously 
promised land a protected preserve so as to prevent the indigenous community 
from claiming all of the granted territory). 
 54. See AMNESTY, supra note 10, at 5 (detailing the Paraguayan Congress’ 
tabling of legislation designed to pass into law a bill already signed by the 
president giving lands to the indigenous peoples of Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa). 
 55. See Id. (highlighting the stalled political process even after presidential 
approval of the transfer of land to the Yakye Axa indigenous community). 
 56. Reparations in the Inter-American System: A Comparative Approach, 
supra note 32, at 1455. 
 57. See AMNESTY, supra note 10, at 11.At this stage of the claim, the Court  
rendered a favorable judgment and the government  tried to  acquiesce to the 
judgment. Nevertheless, the standard of reparations was still not met. These are 
the claims that require the most attention and creative problem solving from 
reforms attempting to increase the effectiveness of the reparations process.   
 58. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International 
Economic Law-Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-
economic Areas, 2.2 J.  INT’L ECON. L. 189, 191–92 (1999) (arguing that there are 
many lessons to be learned by international lawyers working within the UN and 
ICJ procedures concerning human rights from compulsory adjudication methods 
common in international economic law). 
BURKE Note Formatted 2 12/9/2010  2:02 PM 
2011] INDIGENOUS REPARATIONS RE-IMAGINED 133 
 
some success.59  The difficulty lies in transferring this relative 
success into gainful settlements of the specific claims of 
indigenous peoples.  
A. ECHR MECHANISMS FOR SETTLEMENTS 
The ECHR, as an adjudicative body dedicated to resolving 
human rights claims,60 has much more experience than the IAS 
in dealing with friendly settlements between States and human 
rights victims.61  Despite the ECHR’s under utilization of 
friendly settlements,62 it has developed relatively flexible and 
efficient procedures and enforcement mechanisms. 
Rule 62 of the ECHR Rules of Court govern the initiation 
of friendly settlement proceedings by mandating that the 
Regsitrar “enter into contact with the parties with a view to 
securing a friendly settlement.”63  While similar language is 
present in the American Convention, the IACHR must only 
“make itself available” to the parties to assist with friendly 
settlement. Rule 54A in the European Convention goes on to 
state that the Court may require parties to include settlement 
proposals in the initial response phase of a joint procedure.64 
Finally, the newly authorized Protocol 1465 will significantly 
change friendly settlements by permitting friendly settlement 
 
 59. See generally, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION 
BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES AND PRIVATE PARTIES: CONCILIATION, 
MEDIATION, AND ARBITRATION 35–59 (2000) (introducing the main elements of the 
settlement process in the court). 
 60. Like the American Convention on Human Rights, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
provides the overarching structure and content for the European Human Rights 
system. See generally Gregory S. Weber, Who Killed the Friendly Settlement? The 
Decline of Negotiated Resolutions at the European Court of Human Rights, 7.2 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 215, 215–17 (2007) (discussing the decline in friendly 
settlements after reaching its peak in 2002 and 2003). 
 61. See Id. This does not mean, however, that the ECHR utilizes friendly 
settlements as much or as effectively as possible.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Eur. Ct. H.R., Rules of Court, Rule 62(1) (2009) [hereinafter Rules of 
Court]. 
 64. Id. at Rule 54A(1). 
 65. Before February of 2010, Russia blocked the passage of Protocol 14 based 
on fear that such advanced settlement procedures would increase pressure to settle 
various claims, including those brought by Chechnya. In June of 2010, Russia 
agreed to pass Protocol 14. See Haley Wojdowski, Russia Upper House Ratifies 
Europe Rights Court Reform Protocol, JURIST LEGAL NEWS AND RESEARCH, Jan. 27, 
2010, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2010/01/russia-upper-house-ratifies-
europe.php. 
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negotiations even before the Court declares a case admissible.66 
In clarifying that completed friendly settlements end with a 
“judgment,” Protocol 14 ensures that The Committee of 
Ministers will have oversight of the enforcement of the 
agreement.67 
B. PILOT JUDGMENTS 
Pilot judgments represent another recent development the 
ECHR implemented to increase the efficiency and efficacy of 
large-scale settlements.68  Beginning with the first principle 
pilot judgment in 2005,69 the ECHR has utilized this 
mechanism primarily to compel fledging democratic 
governments to align their judicial practices with the rule of 
law.70   
The first step in the process of a pilot judgment requires 
the ECHR to determine whether a large pool of potential 
claimants exist who will potentially have similar claims to that 
of the plaintiff in the case in question.71 The ECHR then rules 
on the “pilot case” and allows its judgment to impact the 
previously identified “class” of similarly situated parties.72 
While the affected State party implements the appropriate 
solution as determined by the ECHR, all other cases in the 
similar “class” are paused until the Committee of Ministers 
confirms that the state in the pilot case implemented the 
original judgment.73 If the Committee finds the implementation 
is successful, then the additional lawsuits continue with a 
 
 66. See Explanatory Report to the CETS 194, § IV, cl. 92 (2009) available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/194.htm [hereinafter 
Explanatory Report]. 
 67. Id. § IV, cl. 94 (explaining that The Committee of Ministers may step in if 
either party shows signs of improper enforcement of the agreement).  
 68. See generally Eur. Ct. H.R., The Pilot-Judgment Procedure, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF4E8456-77B3-4E67-8944-
B908143A7E2C/0/Information_Note_on_the_PJP_for_Website.pdf.  As a relatively 
new concept, scholars have recently begun to comment about the efficacy of this 
new mechanism. While most agree the ECHR has the proper authority to carry out 
pilot judgments, the debate focuses on whether such judgments represent long-
term solutions to the efficiency of the Court or should only be used during the 
transition period for young democracies. 
 69. See generally Broniowski v. Poland, 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 509, 510–38 
(2004) (citing the case where the first principle pilot judgment was used.) 
 70. See The Pilot Judgment Procedure, supra note 68. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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similar settlement.74 This type of mechanism frees up the 
ECHR from various claims that will eventually settle after 
ECHR renders a pilot decision. In using this tool, the ECHR 
has compelled governments, such as Poland, to pre-emptively 
address certain cases before they are brought into the pilot 
judgment process.75 The ECHR has already administratively 
disposed of more than twenty standing cases and potentially 
1.1 million other individual claims.76  
After the parties agree to some type of friendly settlement 
in the ECHR, the Committee of Ministers ensures compliance 
with the agreement.77 As the primary enforcement arm of the 
entire ECHR, the Committee of Ministers conducts periodic 
assessments to ensure parties implement friendly settlement 
agreements just as they would a judgment from the Court.78  
However, the Inter-American System, as an organ of the OAS, 
does not have a parallel body from which to seek help in 
enforcing its decisions.79 
III. THE FUTURE OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE 
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: THE CASE FOR A 
SETTLEMENT APPROACH 
Indigenous reparations represent an opportunity to create 
a new type of friendly settlement mechanism that addresses 
the challenges indigenous claimants currently face. Along with 
the creation of such a mechanism, the IAS must foster a culture 
where friendly settlement can thrive and where all stake-
holders recognize the importance of including indigenous 
reparations in the new creative process. 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. The two principal pilot judgment cases both involve Poland and were 
friendly settlement decisions issued in 2005 and 2008. Broniowski v. Poland, 
(plaintiff was suing for compensation of his land that had been “repatriated” after 
Polish agreements with Ukraine).  
 76. Eur. Ct. H.R., Cases or Groups of Cases against Poland, 2–4 (2009), 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/execution/03_cases/Poland_en.pdf. 
 77. Rules of Court, supra note 63, at Rule 43 (reiterating the Committee of 
Ministers’ role in supervising settlement enforcement). 
 78. The Committee derives its mandate and funding from the EU. Id.   
 79. See Robert K. Goldman, History and Action: The Inter-American Human 
Rights System and the Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
31 HUM. RTS. Q. 856, 882 (2009) (contrasting the work of the Committee of 
Ministers in the ECHR with OAS’s lack of political pressure on offending 
governments and arguing that this lack of enforcement stands as a key challenge to 
the effectiveness of the IACHR). 
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A. CREATING A SETTLEMENT MECHANISM INFORMED BY 
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE 
The ECHR’s advanced jurisprudence, significant case log, 
creative settlement practices, and stronger settlement rules 
and procedures have helped create a more dynamic and prolific 
system of settlement procedures than the IAS.80  All settlement 
mechanisms developed by the Inter-American Commission 
should look to these European practices for guidance.  The most 
significant systems in place with regard to the indigenous 
issues by the ECHR consist of the pilot judgments and the 
ECHR’s new rules and procedures, particularly Protocol 14, 
requiring parties to engage in settlement negotiations even 
before a claim is deemed admissible.81  Adopting this particular 
procedure would allow for quicker resolution of indigenous 
claims because it would funnel them into the indigenous pilot 
judgment reparation mechanism before entering the general 
pool of claims to the IACHR. 
Because of the lack of indigenous issues facing the ECHR, 
any settlement mechanism based primarily on indigenous 
issues must extrapolate lessons and techniques designed for 
other systems.  The pilot judgment mechanisms are designed to 
address many of the same concerns facing the Commission,82 
namely finding solutions to widespread human rights violations 
in the midst of a growing backlog within a structure outfitted 
with an ineffective implementation system. Therefore, lessons 
drawn from the ECHR’s pilot judgment program would 
function as the legal framework from which to craft settlement 
issues in the IAS.83  
 
 80. For most of the past decade, the rate of settlement has been near twelve 
percent. Eur. Ct. H.R., Some Facts and Figures: 1959-2009, 3, 14–15 (2009), 
available at www.echr.coe.int. 
Only with the added influence of Russia upon the court and its refusal to enter into 
any settlement negotiations has that number steadily decreased to about 4%. Eur. 
Ct. H.R., Survey of Activities: 2007, 1, 59 (Strasbourg 2008). 
 81. See Rules of Court, supra note 63, at Rules 33, 43, 54A, and 62.  These 
rules encourage settlement by keeping proceedings private, providing enforcement 
mechanisms through the Committee of Ministers, and allowing the Court to 
condition the hearing of the case only after an attempt towards friendly settlement. 
 82. Costas Paraskeva, Human Rights Protection Begins and Ends at Home: 
The ‘Pilot Judgment Procedure’ Developed by the European Court of Human Rights, 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_hrlcpub/Paraskeva.pdf (highlighting 
various benefits of the Pilot Judgment system, including the general principal that 
it could afford more effective legal remedies domestically). 
 83. Id.  According to the regional body conducting the preliminary research on 
the pilot programs, Article 46 of the European Convention of Human Rights grants 
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As a consolidation tool, the primary benefit of pilot 
judgments is the ability to use the pilot decision and apply its 
redress to the all other similar claims.84 Guided by principles of 
equal protection, an effective pilot judgment could provide 
governments with a model that quells fear of ongoing, endless 
litigation surrounding indigenous claims.85 Dealing with the 
problem at hand the first time in a measured, effective, and fair 
way would help guide policy for lawmakers and temper 
concerns over future conflicts.  
In terms of the actual mechanism in which the indigenous 
pilot judgment program would fit, the IAS already has in place 
a structural body to stand as the model. Currently, before a 
claim even reaches the adjudicative portion of the IACHR, the 
working group on admission criteria evaluates the admissibility 
of each claim.86 Either by adding duties to this specific group, or 
creating a new working group, the foundational mechanism for 
a settlement procedure should be able to funnel all possible 
reparations settlements into a special process before they enter 
the IACHR general pool. This new working group should be 
comprised of independent experts and at least one adjudicative 
official from a neutral country. The specialists must have 
considerable transitional justice background with a deep 
knowledge of Latin American political realities and the various 
principles and standards of settlements. This team will become 
a third party arbitrator that seeks the best result for both 
parties in dispute, independent of any political gain.  
The situation facing Paraguayan indigenous groups, while 
not unique to indigenous claims, provides a template for this 
working group. After their long legal battle within the country 
and through the IAS, the Yakye Axa expected to finally attain 
justice when a favorable judgment was secured from the court, 
buttressed by presidential support. However, even with 
presidential support, justice has been stalled, and is frustrating 
the outcome of the long path the claimants traveled through 
 
such authority.  By analogy to Article 48.1.f in the Inter-American Convention, any 
modified pilot-judgment system geared towards indigenous settlements should 
have the same legal legitimacy. 
 84. See generally EUR. CT. H.R., The Pilot-Judgment Procedure, supra note 68. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, at art. 35 (mandating that a 
working group shall meet prior to each regular session in order to study the 
admissibility of petitions and make recommendations to the plenary of the 
Commission). 
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the courts.87  
With a pilot judgment program or any other specialized 
settlement mechanism in place, the Yakye Axa could have 
involved all the State stakeholders in the process earlier so as 
to increase the effectiveness of implementation. With a trained 
working group advising and facilitating a settlement between 
the claimants, and with government stakeholders generally 
sympathetic to the claimants,88 the Yakye Axa may have 
avoided the domestic struggles that ensued post-judgment.89  
Although some may believe the settlement process is as 
adversarial as litigation (or even more so), the threat of 
creating a precedent that other indigenous claimants can take 
advantage of may convince States that a settlement would offer 
a better outcome than the possible negative political and 
international fallout. States would therefore be more mindful of 
the long-term planning of solutions so as to avoid a situation in 
which one judgment in which they refuse to engage creates a 
flood of claims they cannot handle.90 Furthermore, in the pilot 
judgment settlement process, the predictability afforded by the 
technique would give the key State party stakeholders the time 
and information needed to garner support for the settlement 
 
 87. See generally Díaz, supra note 52. 
 88. Although President Fernando Lugo (the first President to be elected from a 
different political party in over sixty years) assumed power well after the claim was 
under review in 2008, the flexibility of the Court’s procedural mechanism that 
allows transferring of cases to the settlement procedures at any point may have 
accommodated this significant change in the political context. See generally Alexi 
Barrionuevo, Ex-Cleric Wins Paraguay Presidency, Ending a Party’s 62-Year Rule, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2008, at A7. 
 89. President Lugo’s willingness to adhere to the judgments in the Yakye Axa 
case by asking for Congress to expropriate the lands necessary for reparations 
reveals the willingness, if not the political capital, of some Latin American 
governments to be open to settlements. If he had been consulted and designated a 
stake-holder in a settlement proceeding rather than as the complying party on the 
losing side of an adversarial judgment, he could have set clear expectations, time-
frames, and courses of action for how to fulfill a settlement agreement.  As an 
architect of a reparations program, the current challenges of enforcement through 
legislative channels may have been averted. See Andres Gaudin, Paraguay: 
Embattled President Lugo Gets Help from Neighbor Brazil, NOTISUR - SOUTH 
AMERICAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  (July 31, 2009), 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/PARAGUAY:+EMBATTLED+PRESIDENT+LUGO+
GETS+HELP+FROM+NEIGHBOR+BRAZIL.-a0204688078 (detailing the 
President’s commitment to indigenous issues even in the face of current political 
problems). 
 90. See EUR. CT. H.R., The Pilot-Judgment Procedure, supra note 68 
(explaining how Poland improved its domestic remedies to the claims before the 
Pilot judgment was handed down so as to have more control over the ultimate 
remedy). 
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domestically.91 
While the argument for a more streamlined and effective 
settlement system within the IACHR may depend partly on 
other logistical considerations, convincing stakeholders that 
one element of the system should focus solely on indigenous 
reparations is not simple. For all of the possible benefits stated 
above, the current system has not changed fundamentally 
because current incentives for keeping the status quo are too 
great for both parties.92 
From the State perspective, many of those with reparation 
programs already in place may point to the inadequacies of 
such programs as reason to fear further commitment to them.93  
Even States with relatively successful programs may be 
reluctant to give up governmental control over them, which 
often allows lawmakers to find ways to limit or lessen the 
influence of such programs.94  
From the claimant’s side, the idea of settlement may run 
counter to basic notions of justice.95  Receiving a judgment from 
the Court is not always the main goal of taking a case through 
the Inter-American System. Oftentimes the symbolic action of 
holding States accountable in an adjudicatory setting helps 
shift the balance of power towards claimants.  This symbolic 
judgment may not be as strong with a settlement agreement.96  
Therefore, the IAS must take into account such considerations 
and begin laying the groundwork for implementation of a 
settlement mechanism by changing the culture of settlement 
and convincing stakeholders that such a mechanism is 
necessary.  
 
 
 91. See Costas Paraskeva, Human Rights Protection Begins and Ends at 
Home: The ‘Pilot Judgment Procedure’ Developed by the European Court of Human 
Rights, 3 HUM. RTS. L. COMMENT. (2007), http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/s
hared_hrlcpub/Paraskeva.pdf (highlighting various benefits of the Pilot Judgment 
system, including the general principal that it could afford more effective legal 
remedies domestically). 
 92. See Susan H. Shin, Comparison of the Dispute Settlement Procedures of the 
World Trade Organization for Trade Disputes and the Inter-American System for 
Human Rights Violations, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 43, 74–6 (highlighting the inherent 
flaws of the Inter-American settlement system). 
 93. See Id. 
 94. See Id. 
 95. See Id. 
 96. See Id. 
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C. CREATING A CULTURE OF SETTLEMENT  
In changing the culture of settlements, the IAS must do 
more to encourage and facilitate settlement use. Currently, the 
IACHR can only encourage friendly settlements by “plac[ing] 
itself at the disposal of the parties concerned.”97  Although 
amending the American Convention to change this language 
and give the IACHR the authority to order mandatory 
settlement procedures is virtually a political impossibility,98 the 
IACHR should funnel more cases towards settlement and 
provide established mechanisms that clearly show each party 
the benefits of settling early. Currently, many view the 
settlement system as a barrier to reaching a finalized IAS 
ruling on the merits of the claim.99 Settlements may lack the 
comprehensive results of a full domestic reparations system.100 
This may make potential parties skeptical of the approach and 
less willing to invest resources into a settlement process. The 
concern is especially strong for indigenous claimants, who may 
feel from years of previous failures and unequal bargaining 
that attaining justice from the State party in any context will 
be difficult.101 If indigenous claimants knew, however, that 
filing a claim with the IACHR would give them an opportunity 
to enter right away into a reparations settlements where they 
can partially dictate the terms (assuming their claim met 
 
 97. Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, at art. 40.1. 
 98. While the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty were adopted 
by fourteen and eleven nations respectively, the domestic political dynamics 
involved in developing a separate protocol for settlements, especially when 
guidelines are already in place, remains an unrealistic and ultimately impractical 
endeavor.  See generally Nadia Ezzelarab and Brian Tittemore, Round Table 
Discusses U.S. Ratification of Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v2i1/ia
conv21.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (highlighting the difficulty of ratification 
from the perspective of the United States domestic laws and policy). 
 99. See, e.g., Shin, supra note 90, at 68, 74 (stating “The Commission’s 
recommendation for the Court action is severely limited by the ‘friendly settlement; 
requirement.” and “One inherent defect of the entwined Commission/Court system 
is the heavy emphasis on utilizing the ‘friendly settlement’ system.”).  
 100. For a comprehensive explanation of types of reparations for victims, see 
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
ASSOCIATION, DESIGN PARAMETERS FOR A REPARATIONS PROGRAM IN PERU 16–19 
(2002), available at http://www.ictj.org/static/Americas/Peru/Parameters.eng.pdf. 
 101. See generally Standaert, supra note 26, at 530–31 (noting that in the 
context of domestic violence, equalizing the power of the parties at the bargaining 
table can be difficult). 
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established guidelines of the mechanism), they may be more 
amenable to filing claims and settling before a judgment by the 
IACHR or IACtHR.102 
The onus is then on the facilitator to fashion a settlement 
regime that educates and guides the Parties so as to highlight 
the efficiencies and advantages of solving the claim outside of 
the traditional adversarial system.103  This shift in emphasis 
would allow the Commission to funnel cases into genuine 
settlement processes, and give the IACHR more authority to 
assert pressure on parties. 
The current changes of the friendly settlement procedures 
for the IACHR reveals the Commission’s influence in forcing 
settlement may be stronger than in the past.  Therefore, in the 
short term, the IAS can take intermediate steps towards these 
goals even without a fully developed settlement mechanism in 
place. Members of the IACHR should suggest that parties 
engage in settlement before admissibility hearings.  
Furthermore, members should attend trainings in settlements 
facilitation so as to better understand the best practices of 
international friendly settlement.104  When the IAS eventually 
implements full mechanisms, such as the Indigenous 
Reparations process proposed in this note, the culture of the 
IACHR and IACtHR will be more agreeable to its 
implementation. 
D. CONVINCING STAKEHOLDERS TO USE THE INDIGENOUS 
REPARATIONS PROCESS AS A SETTLEMENT TOOL 
When the IAS eventually implements changes to the 
settlement process, profound questions will remain about the 
appropriateness of using settlement mechanisms for indigenous 
claims. The IAS has already developed a fairly robust 
jurisprudence in the area of indigenous rights, and the goal of 
an indigenous reparations settlement mechanism is to continue 
this process.  Some worry that the Inter American System’s 
current recognition of indigenous property rights will soon fade, 
 
 102. See generally id., at 536–37 (arguing that settlements provide victims an 
opportunity to craft their own vision of justice).  
 103. Compare Explanatory Report, supra note 66 (explaining that Protocol 14 is 
designed to shift settlement power back to the facilitators) with Rules of Procedure, 
supra note 25, at art. 4.2 (explaining that parties hold primary settlement power). 
 104. Examples include sending members of the IAS to conferences hosted by 
the ABA Section on Dispute Resolution and the U.S. Federal Judicial Center, 
bodies dedicated to the advancement of friendly settlement techniques.  
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which makes the task all the more difficult.105  
However, the creation of an effective settlement 
mechanism designed specifically to address indigenous 
repartitions would flow from the IAS’s main strength: its 
flexibility and ingenuity in developing varied and efficient 
solutions to historical and ongoing human rights abuses.106 
Furthermore, without sudden changes in the speed of State 
acquiescence to court mandated reparations,107 the IAS must 
continually find ways to assert its influence creatively. 
Even when cases survive the cumbersome process and 
obtain a favorable judgment, implementation remains difficult. 
Using a settlement mechanism to bring a State party on board 
at an earlier stage in the proceedings may facilitate higher 
rates of compliance and therefore provide effective remedies.108 
The Paraguayan cases reveal this reality for indigenous 
advocates.  Even though the Yakye Axa successfully won a 
favorable judgment from the Court, justice has not been 
forthcoming. Since the current standstill in the legislative 
process signals an indefinite delay in securing the court-
mandated judgment, claimants have a better chance at working 
within a settlement mechanism that encourages all parties to 
the table faster and provides them with the possibility of more 
timely results.109 
The existence of these problems is pushing the Inter-
American System to look towards settlement solutions that 
both draw upon and go beyond previously established 
 
 105. See, e.g., Shin, supra note 90, at 66–72 (arguing that the court’s recent 
interpretation of the property consideration of non-active usage signals a 
reluctance to extend Indigenous property rights). 
 106. See Carozza, supra note 8 (arguing that the Commission’s strength is in its 
multiple methods of addressing human rights issues, including judicial 
proceedings, country reports and visits, special rappatourships, and educational 
initiatives). 
 107. See Shin, supra note 90, at 66 (arguing that States generally refuse to 
acquiesce easily). 
 108. See Armstrong Wiggins, Director of Indian Law Resource Ctr. Washington 
D.C. Office, Introductory Statement at Policy Roundtable: Tomorrow's Human 
Rights: Addressing the Challenges Ahead (Nov. 11, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.indianlaw.org/node/517)  (recognizing that apart from a universal 
declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, there “is a consistent regional body 
of law developed by both the Commission and the Court that is supposed to 
expedite the negotiation, settlement, and ultimately the adversarial judicial 
process…[but that] states ignore such a body of law on the rights of indigenous 
peoples” throughout the negotiation process and even after unfavorable judgments). 
 109. See generally AMNESTY, supra note 10, at 11. 
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jurisprudence.110 Unless indigenous advocates are willing to 
develop solutions to these overarching problems, the backlog in 
the IAS and the lack of enforcement will continue. 111 The 
current settlement process is underdeveloped and 
underutilized.112 Therefore, it is most prudent for indigenous 
advocates, and human rights advocates in general, to push for a 
specialized Indigenous Reparations settlement mechanism. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the Inter-American Commission continues to establish 
its legitimacy as a fundamental protector of human rights for 
indigenous populations in the American States, the current 
challenges of the increasing backlog of claims, limited 
resources, and contentious cases will continue to demand 
creative solutions. Already a fixture of the European system, 
progressive-friendly settlement procedures and mechanisms 
provide one such solution to these problems.  The IAS must 
develop its own versions of these settlement tools to maximize 
their appeal to both indigenous claimants and State parties. 
Instead of resisting such mechanisms for fear that they will not 
fully secure human rights, indigenous claimants should view 
them as an opportunity to expand current reparations models 
that have provided an infrastructure, if not full remedies, to 
other reparations issues. Endowed with predictive and 
consolidative tools, such as pilot judgments, States should find 
incentives from participating in an indigenous settlement 
regime that may ultimately condensing the claims against it 
and bolster its human rights record. 
 
 
 110. See Wiggins, supra note 108 (arguing that “[T]he Commission should not 
stay silent before such an attitude. On the contrary, it should engage in the 
negotiation process by stating the governing principle of law on the issue under 
negotiation and by promoting the respect of such a principle by all parties.”). 
 111. Id. (noting that while hearings held before the Commission on the growing 
development into indigenous lands have increased in frequency, the burgeoning 
caseload of the Commission prevents them from being utilized for state-specific 
solutions).  
 112. Since the year 2000, only a total of 8 cases in any given year were decided 
via settlement agreement. See generally Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights, Annual Reports 2000–2008, available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annual.eng.htm.  
